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IN THE SUPREME COURT.
OF THE ST'AT'E OIF UTAH

JOHN R. BUTLER, d/b/a
DAVIS & BUTLER
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Appell(JJ}1;t,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9527

THE STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Respondent.

AP·PELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action involving the assessment of a sales
and a use tax against Davis & Butler Construction Company for the period 1955 through 1959.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BELOW
The State Tax Commission, by its Decision of June
30, 1961, sustained a deficiency in the amount of $1,008.07
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for the period July 1, 1955, to December 31, 1956, for
unpaid use taxes; sustained a deficiency for the period
January 1, 1957, to September 30, 1959, in the amount
of $19,519.47 for unpaid use tax; and dismissed the sales
tax deficiency in the amount of $2,777.45 assessed in connection with the purchase of an airplane.

RELIEF SOUGHT BY THIS APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the Decision of the Respondent reversed, dismissing the tax deficiencies assessed and
sustained in the amounts of $1,008.07 and $19,549.14, and,
if necessary, to have the case remanded to the State Tax
Commission for admission of the evidence under the
proffer of proof, in accordance with the decision of this
Court, dismissing the tax deficiencies.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant is a construction company with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. During
the taxable periods in question, appellant was engaged in
the construction of various projects as a general contractor, and in this capacity, purchased pursuant to purchase orders and to subcontracts, various items of personal property. Respondent prepared an audit upon the
basis of which the tax was assessed. (R. 7-10) (Exs. 1, 2)
The audit was the result of a rather cursory examination
of some of appellant's records (R. 9), with no reference
to whether tax was paid in other states. (R. 11) and without examination of any vendors' records.
2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The major item upon which the use tax deficiency
was assessed, was a subcontract of $67 4, 775.00 with
B. I. F. Company of Rhode Island for furnishing, installing, and servicing equipment on the Salt Lake City Water
Treatment Plant. The use tax was assessed against this
total contract amount without regard to the portion thereof attributable to labor and services, or to property and
materials, (Exs. 1, 2) and without inquiry to B. I. F. or
its agent, J. Henry Jones Company. (R. 14) At the hearing before the Tax Commission, all evidence relating to
the nature of this contract was objected to by respondent, and was not admitted by the Commission on the
theory that there had been no tax paid to the State of
Utah thereon, and as a result, the tax was due and payable. (R. 18, 19) The proffer of proof made at the trial,
however, indicated the nature of the relationship between
appellant and B. I. F. as well as between the appellant
and other vendors. This proffer of proof showed the facts
to be the following:
The B. I. F. Company undertook, along with the J.
Henry Jones Company of Salt Lake City as its local
agent, the preparation of the contract, plans and specifications for the construction of the Water Treatment
Plant. (R. 94, 96, 97) (Exs. 50, 51, 52) This work to be
undertaken by B. I. F. as a subcontractor for Davis &
Butler Construction Company, consisted of furnishing,
installing, inspecting and servicing technical equipment
used in the construction of the Water Treatment Plant.
It further consisted of the instruction of operators of this
equipment after its installation. (P. Ex. 52, Sections 34,
3
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35 and 38) J. Henry Jones Company, for its participation as agent for B. I. F., received a commission out of
the total contract of $67 4,775.00. This was a very complicated type of installation, requiring the technical experience of B. I. F., and the employment of engineering
personnel having at least 5 years engineering experience.
It also involved the coordinated construction of complicated electrical and plumbing services, all according to
the plans and specifications. (Ex. 52) (R. 102)
J. Henry Jones Company worked with and assisted
B. I. F. in the preparation of the contract with appellants,
in the checking of plans and specifications, (R. 100) and
in advising the various subcontractors involved in the
work, including appellant. The J. Henry Jones Company
was in constant contact with the local engineers of B. I. F.
Company in coordinating the work of the various subcontractors. (R. 65, 66) B. I. F., during all of this construction, maintained local representatives in addition to
J. Henry Jones Company. (R. 71) In order to properly
perform the work, B. I. F. employed Peters Plumbing &
Heating Company (R. 31, 32, 61, 100) to do the plumbing
work. In this capacity, Peters performed a substantial
amount of the labor required of B. I. F. (R. 64) In performing this work for B. I. F., Peters backcharged
B. I. F., and this backcharge credit was then offset in
another subcontract between Peters and Davis & Butler.
This offset was a credit against the $674,000.00 subcontract price, payable from Davis & Butler to B. I. F. (R.
66, 67, 68)
4
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B. I. F. also employed Industrial, Physics and Electronic Company as subcontractor to perform the installation and servicing of some of the more technical equipment of the B. I. F.- Davis & Butler contract. (R. 32)
Throughout the course of the performance of the contract by B. I. F., its employees and engineers installed
control hook-ups (R. 62), venturi tubes and other types of
tubes and meters (Ex. 52, Section 34) furnished and
installed the water pump controls (Ex. 52, Section 35),
and furnished and installed, among other things, the filter flow controls. (Ex. 52, Section 383
B. I. F. was on the job until1961, during which time
it worked, together with J. Henry Jones Company, in
servicing and fixing all of its installations previously
made during the actual construction. This work went on
for weeks at a time. (R. 31, 57, 61, 98-100)

J. Henry Jones Company was the local agent and representative for B. I. F. not only in the sale and distribution of B. I. F. products, but also in the many capacities
listed above. J. Henry Jones Company all during the
period in question, had a sales tax license with the State
Tax Commission. (R. 90)
With reference to other portions of the assessed tax,
and again under the proffer of proof, the evidence concerning the relationship of the various vendors show that
many of them maintained local offices at which the appellant purchased the property assessed for the use tax.
Fischer-Porter maintained a local office in Salt Lake City
5
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from which appellant purchased the materials being
assessed. (R. 20) (Exs. 6, 7, 38 and 39) The .property
was obtained under a subcontract wherein appellant paid
the sales tax to Fischer-Porter. The materials included in
the assessment on Ex. 9 constituted a sale not to appellant, but to Peters Plumbing & Heating Company. (R. 18)
The materials purchased from A. C. Horning Company
(Ex. 15) were purchased from Horning's local office in
Salt Lake City. (R. 27) The equipment purchased from
Mixing Equipment Company (Ex. 19) was purchased
from that company's local representative here in Salt
Lake City. (R. 37, 38) The material purchased from
Chicago Pump Company (Ex. 31) was also purchased
through the local office of said company at Nickerson Machinery Company of Salt Lake City. (R. 41, 42) Likewise, the property purchased from Jeffrey Manufacturing Company (Ex. 32) was purchased from that company's local representative here in Salt Lake City.
(R. 42)
The respondent has assessed use taxes against all
of the foregoing purchases without regard to the fact that
the sale and purchase of said property was made in
Salt Lake City through the local office of the said vendor.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT

I.

THE RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO SHOW
PROPER ASSESSMENT OF THE USE TAX.
6
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PoiNT II.
THE APPELLANT IS NOT LIABLE TO PAY
THE USE TAX ASSESSED BY THE RESPONDENT.
A. RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO
PROVE BY ANY EVIDENCE THAT
APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO THE
USE TAX.
B. THERE IS NO STATUTORY PROVISION AUTHORIZING COLLECTION
OF THE TAX FROM APPELLANT.
POINT III.
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN REFUSING
TO ADMIT EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE
TYPE OF TRANSACTION BETWEEN APPELLANT AND ITS VENDORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS.
ARGUMENT
PorNT I.
THE RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO SHOW
PROPER ASSESSMENT OF THE USE TAX.
The Constitution of the State of Utah provides under
Article XIII, Section 2, as follows :
''All tangible property in the state not exempt
under the laws of the United States or under this
Constitution shall be taxed in proportion to its
value to be ascertained as provided by law ... ''
Upon this basic premise, the burden falls upon the respondent to show that the use tax is applied to personal
7
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property used, consumed, or stored in the State of Utah.
The respondent has the burden of showing that the tax
applies to the tangible property, and not to labor or services rendered in connection therewith.
In the case at hand, the respondent put on evidence
in the form of testimony of Henry Jones to the effect that
the B. I. F. contract involved not only materials, but also
labor and services. Having so shown, the respondent destroyed any presumption that may have been in its favor
to the effect that the tax was properly assessed upon tangible personal property. Respondent attempted to show
that the labor and services were relatively insignificant,
or incidental to the contract for the materials. It offered
no evidence, however, to make any breakdown as to values
between materials and labor.
Respondent introduced Exhibits 45 through 49 as
self-serving and heresay evidence to attempt to show that
· the labor was insignificant. The Commission denied the
offer of said exhibits, and no appeal has been taken therefrom. On the contrary, appellant's evidence in the form of
the B. I. F. contract (Exs. 42, 50, 51) and testimony of
John R. Butler, Ferris Daniels, Henry Jones, Gerald R.
Clyde and Max Peters, indicated that substantial labor
and services were rendered by the B. I. F. Company in
the performance of its contract with petitioner for the
furnishing of material and labor in the construction of
the Water Treatment Plant. (R. 20, 27, 31, 32, 36-38, 61,
66, 67, 68, 96, 97-100)
8
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The assessment of $1,008.07 use tax (Ex. 1, 2) has no
fadnal support whatsoever. There is no relationship to
any of the invoices or contracts. It is simply an arithmetical computation without basis. This is indicative of the
inadequate audit and proof of tax liability throughout
respondent's tax determinations.
Unless respondent can show that its tax is applicable
to property used and consumed in the State of Utah,
respondent cannot show proper assessment of the use tax.
The respondent has failed completely in assuming this
burden in the hearing before the Tax Commission.
It is manifest that there must be a determination of
the proportion of materials and of labor in any lump sum
contract, so that the tax is only applied to the materials.
Young Electric Sig'n Compamyv. Tax Commission, 4 Utah
2d 242. Respondent has ignored this principle in the
instant case.
PoiNT

II.

THE APPELLANT IS NOT LIABLE TO PAY
THE USE TAX ASSESSED BY THE RESPONDENT.
A. RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO
PROVE BY ANY EVIDENCE THAT
APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO THE
USE TAX.
Title 59-16-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, exempts
certain properties from the application of the use tax,
including the following:
"(a) Property, the gross receipts from the sale
of which are required to be included in the measure
9
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of the tax imposed by Chapter 63, Laws of Utah,
1933, and any amendments made or which may be
made thereto.
"(b)
" (c)

" (d) Property, the gross receipts from the sale,
distribution or use of which are neither subject to
a sale or excise tax under the laws of this state, or
of some other state of the United States.''
Respondent has the burden of showing that petitioner does not come under these two exemptions (a) and
(d). The sales tax law and the use tax law are inter-related and supplemental, and if a transaction is taxed or
taxable under the sales tax law, it is not taxable under
the use tax law. The burden of proof is clearly on the
taxing body to show that use tax is applicable, particularly where, as in this case, the tax is a special excise tax.
84 C. J. S., Par. 225, and cases cited under Notes 50 and 51.
All of the evidence, whether offered by respondent or
appellant, indicates that the B. I. F. Company was doing
business in the State of Utah, and as such, was taxable
by the respondent under the Sales Tax Act. The exemption above cited would, therefore, apply. The record indicates that J. Henry Jones Company supervised the
construction and installation of the equipment purchased
from the B. I. F. Company and placed on the job in the
performance of the general contract. (R. 65, 66, 100) The
evidence further shows that the B. I. F. Company employed Peters Plumbing & Heating Company as its subcontractor to perform its work in the installation and
10
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servicing of the equipment purchased from it by appellant. (R. 31, 32, 61, 100) The evidence further shows that
Henry Jones Company prepared the plans and specifications for the installation of this equipment for and on
behalf of B. I. F. Company, prepared and negotiated the
contract between appellant and B. I. F. Company, and
continually furnished supervisory, as well as specialized
engineers to assist in the operation of the equipment after
it was installed. (R. 65, 66, 71)
In the case of Nelson, v. Sears Roebuck Company,
312 U. S. 359, and Nelson v. Montgomery Ward Company, 312 U.S. 373, as cited in Montgomery Ward v. Utah
State Tax Commission,, 112 Pac. 2d 152, a mail order
house doing business in the State of Utah was held taxable for goods sold to a consumer in Utah. The uncontroverted evidence in the case at bar clearly permits the
same holding, and requires the taxing of a sale of property from B. I. F. to appellant as a sales tax.

B. I. F. was amendable to the enforcement of the
tax liability, and this was, therefore, a sales tax transaction. There being a sales tax liability, there can be no
use tax assessed and collected against the appellant. In
Utah Concrete Products Corporation v. Utah State Tax
Commission, 105 Utah 513, a contractor was held to be a
cousumer, and the sale of materials to him was held to be
a taxable sale under the Sales Tax Act, and thus requiring
the vendor to pay the tax. The failure of the respondent
to enforce the sales tax against the proper retailer should
not give rise to a use tax liability against appellant.
11
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The evidence is clear and uncontroverted that not
only was B. I. F. represented in Utah, and taxable under
the Sales Tax Act, but also were the vendors, FischerPorter, (R. 20) A. C. Horning (R. 27) Mixing Equipment
Company, (R. 37, 38) Chicago Pump Company (R. 41,
42) and Jeffrey Manufacturing Company. (R. 42)
The respondent has completely failed in its proof to
show the liability of the petitioner under the Use Tax
Act. Each of the transactions were taxable as sales tax
transactions, and the tax could and should have been collected from the proper retailer designated by the Sales
Tax Act.
B. THERE IS NO STATUTORY PROVISION AUTHORIZING COLLECTION
OF THE TAX FROM APPELLANT ..
This Supreme Court has stated in the case of Western Leather & Finding Compamy v. State Tax Commission, 87 Utah 227, that the Tax Commission cannot
delegate the payment of tax to someone who is not specifically designated in the statutes. The taxing power is
a power limited by the statute. Our statute requires that
the retailer register with the Tax Commission, and further provides that the use tax shall be collected by the
retailer. Title 59-16-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, specifically provides :
''Every retailer making sales of tangible personal
property for storage, use or other consumption in
this state not exempt under the provisions of Section 59-16-4 hereof, shall be responsible for the
collection of the tax imposed by this Act from the
purchaser ... The tax herein required to be col-
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lected by the retailer should constitute a debt owed
by the retailer to this state."
It is, therefore, apparent that the use tax must be
collected by the retailer, B. I. F., as well as the other
vendors mentioned herein, if such a tax is properly
assessable. The fact that the respondent finds it difficult,
or even impossible to collect said tax from the retailer,
does not enlarge the statutory authority to permit it to
collect the tax from a consumer such as appellant.
The statute makes it mandatory for the retailer, not
the consumer, to keep the necessary records and file the
necessary returns, all for the purpose of effecting the
proper tax collection. The appellant has no way of determining the correctness of the tax, since it is not
required to, and has not established records to properly
make these determinations. The B. I. F. contract is a
lump sum contract for materials and labor. Appellant
has no way of knowing how the vendor has segregated
materials from labor in arriving at his lump sum figure.
It, therefore, is in no position to make a return involving
the tax on the consumption of the material bills of the subcontractor. The vendor, B. I. F. Company, on the other
hand, being required to keep such records and being in
the position of designating the proper breakdown between property and labor, is able to make a return, and
should be liable for the payment of the tax.
PoiNT

III.

THE COMMISSION ERRED IN REFUSING
TO ADMIT EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE
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TYPE OF TRANSACTION BETWEEN APPELLANT AND ITS VENDORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS.
At Page 17 of the Transcript of the Record, counsel
for respondent objected to any testimony regarding any
of the invoices which had been used by the Tax Commission in assessing the tax upon the ground that it was
admitted that no tax had been paid by appellant to the
state. The Chairman of the Commission sustained this
objection, stating:
"That would be immaterial. I am sure this objection is correct because the use tax provides for the
payment in this state, if materials are used in
this state, and it wouldn't matter whether they
paid sales taxes elsewhere, so if that is the purpose of this, I will sustain the objection."
All testimony and evidence from that point on relating to the maintenance of a local office in the State of
Utah, to the fact that many of the prices covered labor
instead of materials, and, to the fact that taxes could
have been properly assessed and paid for under the Sales
Tax Act, was all made by proffer of proof. This ruling of
the Commission was clearly in error for the reason that
appellant should have been permitted to put on evidence
to show the application of any exemptions to the Use Tax
Act to which appellant would be entitled.
Title 59-16-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in effect
provides that if an action was taxable under the Sales
Tax Act, or was taxable under the taxing statutes of
another state, that the use tax would not apply. The rea-
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son for the inter-relation of the sales tax and use tax
laws is apparent. If the sales tax is payable, then the use
tax is not.
Appellant clearly should have the opportunity of
showing that the use tax is not applicable in a particular
transaction, either because the tax had not been properly
assessed against tangible property only, or because the
transaction was taxable under the Sales Tax Law of
Utah, or because the transaction was taxable under the
Sales Tax Law of another state. The Commissioner's
ruling denying all evidence on these points was clearly
in error.
Appellant, in its subcontract agreements with B. I. F.
and with other subcontractors, has already, in paying the
contract price, paid the sales tax. It is, therefore, inequitable to now assess appellant with the use tax on the
theory merely that appellant has used the property in
the State of Utah, and that any other factors are
immaterial.
The tax on the B. I. F. contract, and on the other
contracts for materials purchased in the State of Utah
from local representatives could have been, and should
have been taxed against the vendors or the subcontractors
under the Sales Tax Act. Such vendors and subcontractors had in effect collected the tax from appellant, and
should have been required to pay it to the State of Utah.
The State admittedly made little or no effort to attempt
to collect the said tax as a sales tax, even though the local
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representative of B. I. F. Company was registered with
the Tax Commission under a sales tax license.
The mere difficulty or inconvenience of collecting the
tax from the vendor should not in the absence of a statutory provision, authorize the Tax Commission to collect
the tax from the appellant. All of the evidence points to
the ultimate conclusion that this tax could and should
have been collected both as a practical and as a legal
matter from the vendors and subcontractors. Any and all
evidence which relates to sustaining this position should
have been admitted and considered by the respondent.
Had it been admitted, respondent could have come to no
other conclusion than that the B. I. F. contract amount, to
the extent applicable to property only, was collectible
from B. I. F. through the J. Henry Jones Company, and
that the other named subcontract amounts and purchase
prices for property purchased in the State of Utah were
likewise collectible on a sales tax basis from the vendors
or subcontractors.
SUMMARY
The respondent has produced no evidence to show
that the tax has been properly assessed against tangible
property. The Tax Commission has no authority either
under the Sales and Use Tax Law, or under the Utah
Constitution to assess the use tax against appellant based
upon the price of labor incident to the installation of
various pieces of equipment. Respondent has likewise
produced no evidence to show that the use tax and not
the sales tax is applicable to appellant. Respondent relied
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solely upon the testimony that no tax had been paid to the
State of Utah by appellant on the various purchase prices
or subcontract amounts. This evidence clearly establishes
no justification for the assessment of a use tax.
There was no attempt by respondent either evidentially at the hearing, or as a practical matter in the collection of the tax, to reach, or to attempt to reach the
vendors or subcontractors from whom appellant purchased the personal property and labor involved in the
amounts in question. There is no evidence whatsoever of
any attempt to place these amounts in the category of a
sales tax, and to follow the sales tax collection procedures set forth in the statute. Neither is there any evidence
to show that there is any authority under our taxing
statute which permits respondent to collect this tax from
the appellant. The whole tenor of the use tax, as well
as the sales tax statutes, is to require the vendor to maintain the records, to take out the proper licenses, and to
collect and pay the taxes to the State of Utah.
The inequity of requiring the consumer in this case
to pay these taxes is demonstrated by the fact that appellant has already paid the taxes to the vendors, and by
the further fact that appellant has no records to aid it
in distinguishing between the value of the property and
the value of labor. Had appellant been required by the
statutes to maintain these records with the intent in mind
of ultimately paying the tax, then we would not have the
complete confusion which now exists in attempting to
allocate values to the property as distinguished from the

17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

htbor. Neither would appellant ha.ve a1ready paid the
tax i:o the vendors, arid rendered itself subject to a double payment.
Appellant respectfully claims that the use tax defieie:ricy sustained by respondent be dismissed~ and that the
bond and sum of $5,ooe~oo which has been heretofore deposited with respondent, be returned to appelHtnt.
Respectfully submitted,

CLYDE & MECHAM
By ELLIOTT LEE PRATT
Attorneys /or

Appeiiarnt
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